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“A Nation in a Hurry”:  
The costs of local governance reforms in Rwanda 
 
Abstract 
Almost twenty years on from the horrors of the genocide, Rwanda is drawing considerable 
international attention as it emerges as a leading African success story.  Its strong economic 
performance, with growth rates averaging eight percent over the last ten years, has led some 
to argue that it represents a new form of African developmental state. This article draws on 
fieldwork conducted in early 2013 to examine the political impact of the government‟s 
developmental reforms at local levels.  Charting developments in local governance over the 
last decade, it demonstrates an increasing centralisation of deliberation and decision-making 
on local development in tandem with growing pressures and demands on local communities 
to invest – physically and financially – in centrally promoted activities and programmes.  The 
findings, which uncover growing levels of popular disquiet and dissent with the centrally 
driven approach, raise questions regarding the level of embeddedness and legitimacy of the 
regime and therefore the sustainability of its development project,  The findings also 
challenge the currently popular „good enough governance‟ agenda in that they demonstrate 
that local governance and state-societal relations do matter, most especially when the 
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Introduction 
The level of debate and literature on Rwanda‟s development since the aftermath of the 1994 
genocide is noteworthy for both its volume and its intensely polarised nature.  On the one 
hand, commentators and scholars celebrate the remarkable developmental achievements of 
this small, landlocked, resource-poor state recovering from the trauma of a horrific genocide 
(Clark, 2010; Ensign and Bertrand, 2009; Stansell, 2009; Golooba-Mutebi, 2008; see also 
Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012;  Gourevitch, 2009; Zakira, 2009; and Kinzer, 2008 for more 
popular accounts).  There is much substance to these claims.  In the last ten year period, the 
country has registered average growth rates of 8 per cent per annum and has reduced inflation 
since 2009 (IMF, 2013).  It has received widespread praise for its economic governance 
reforms and low levels of corruption, making it an increasingly attractive location for inward 
investment (IMF, 2013; World Bank, 2013: 37-41).  On the social front, through a series of 
„fast-track reforms‟ in agriculture, infrastructural developments and social service provision 
at local levels, the government appears to have effected a spectacular reversal in poverty and 
inequality in recent years, reporting a decline in income poverty from 57 per cent in 2006 to 
45 per cent in 2011 and a fall in the country‟s Gini coefficient from 0.52 to 0.49 over the 
same period (GoR, 2013)
i
.  The country is on track to meet two of its millennium 
development goals (MDGs) - in health and education, and has drawn much attention as the 
global leader on female political representation – surging to 64 per cent in recent 
parliamentary elections.   
 
These remarkable outcomes notwithstanding, Rwanda is not without its critics.  Criticisms 
are, for the most part, centred around two areas.  The first is the country‟s alleged political 
interference and criminal activities in Eastern Congo (UNSC, 2012; Prunier, 2011; Reyntjens, 
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2009) – allegations which the government continues to deny but which led to the suspension 
of development aid in 2004, 2011 and 2012/13.  The second focuses on the authoritarian, top-
down style of governance which, critics argue, employs a discourse of national unity and 
reconciliation to silence political opposition and dissent (Ansoms, 2011; Desrosiers and 
Thomson, 2011; Purdeková, 2011; Reyntjens, 2010; 2004; Straus, 2006) while also 
exercising an excessive control over the media, information and narratives on the Rwandan 
story more broadly (Beswick, 2010; Frère et al, 2010; Ingelaere, 2010; Reyntjens, 2010 and 
Pottier, 2002).  At more local levels, while the government, through its much celebrated 
decentralisation programme
ii
, emphasises the participatory nature of local governance with 
development priorities and actions determined by communities themselves, others have 
pointed toward strong centralised tendencies in the implementation of certain policies and 
programmes at these levels (see Waldorf, 2011 on Gacaca; Newbury, 2011 on the 
Umuganda villagisation programme; and Ansoms, 2008, 2009 and Ansoms and Rostagno, 
2012 on rural development initiatives).  These contributions raise significant questions in 
relation to the popular legitimacy of the fast track reform process, together with the role of 
local communities within it.   
 
This article aims to make a contribution in this regard.  It draws on relevant policy and field 
research on local governance in Rwanda.  Field research was conducted in February-March, 
2013 across six diverse sites (selected to reflect both geographic and socio-economic 
diversity and including one of the wealthiest and one of the poorest districts in the country).  
It was not possible to select for ethnic difference or to explore ethnic issues as legislation 
introduced in 2008 now renders any discussion or mention of ethnicity a criminal offence 
(charges include „divisionism‟, „negationism‟ and „genocide ideology‟).  This would have 
provided a clear rationale for Rwandan authorities to deny the research visa which is now 
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required of all foreign researchers and which proved extremely difficult to secure in this 
case
iii
.  Semi-structured interviews with 99 randomly selected residents (50 female; 49 male – 
selected as the third woman/man encountered while walking through villages each day where 
my freelance translator and I arrived unannounced) and 23 semi-structured interviews with 
local authorities (nine at district level; eight at sector level; and six at cell level) were 
conducted in total across the six sites.  In addition, research included a structured observation 
of an Umuganda local planning session in Kigali, and semi-structured interviews with two 
national government officials; three non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and eight 
international donor representatives.  Interview transcripts were coded following fieldwork 
and the data was process through SPSS to allow for descriptive statistical analysis.  
 
The findings chart developments in local governance over the last decade and demonstrate an 
increasing centralisation of deliberation and decision-making on local development in tandem 
with growing pressures and demands on local communities to invest – physically and 
financially – in centrally promoted activities and programmes.  These findings, which 
uncover growing levels of popular disquiet and dissent with the centrally driven approach, 
raise questions regarding the legitimacy of the ruling regime and therefore, the sustainability 
of its development project,  The article is structured as follows. 
 
The following section conceptualises the Rwandan states‟ fast track reform project by 
situating it within contemporary debates on the nature and evolution of African 
developmental states and the current interest in development studies circles in „good enough 
governance‟.  Drawing on my fieldwork, the third section examines the two principle 
community planning initiatives, ubudehe and umuganda.  The transformation of the former in 
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the mid 2000s from a local, participatory, deliberative planning process to a technocratic, 
socio-economic classification system is traced, while the equation of community participation 
with individual responsibility and locally negotiable cost-sharing for centrally driven reforms 
in the latter is examined.  The resultant disconnect between community and local authority 
priorities is also highlighted in this section.  With an eye to the ongoing high levels of 
inequality within Rwanda, the fourth section takes a closer look at the critical question of 
who pays for these centrally-driven reforms.  It finds that a disproportionate burden of cost 
lies with local communities and reveals a growing public disquiet with the escalating costs of 
arbitrary, locally negotiable taxes.  The article concludes with a discussion of the implications 
of the findings for contemporary thinking in relation to the currently popular „good enough 
governance‟ agenda and the African developmental states literature more broadly. 
 
 
“A Nation in a Hurry”:  Theorising the Rwandan state 
The recent confluence of the increased emphasis on statebuilding within Development 
Studies and International Relations (see Marquette and Beswick, 2011) with the post-good 
governance move from normative and ultimately unsuccessful „best practice‟ to „best fit‟ 
(Booth, 2011: 1) as typified by the range of „good enough‟ institutional arrangements now 
advocated by a number of analysts (for example the Menocal‟s, (2011) „good enough 
statebuilding‟; the ODI‟s „good enough governance‟ (Booth, 2011); Hayman‟s (2011) „good 
enough democracy‟, and the World Bank‟s (2011) „inclusive enough settlements‟), has 
focused attention on the nature and performance of the Rwandan state, together with those of 
African states more broadly.  In particular, drawing on the „developmental state‟ literature 
which emerged in the wake of developmental successes in East Asia, there has been a 
noticeable interest in examining if this concept proves useful in analysing contemporary 




 (see Fritz and Menocal, 2007; Edigheji, 2010; and Meyns and 
Musamba, 2010).   
 
While the meaning of the term „developmental state‟ is both disputed and evolving (Evans, 
1995), two broad fundamental features of such states may be identified (Meyns and 
Musamba, 2010; Routley, 2014).  The first is that they produce „developmental outcomes‟ – 
again a contested concept but generally including economic growth promoted by policies for 
rapid industrialisation; increases in the standard of living for a large proportion of the 
population through redistribution; and agricultural reform.  The Rwandan government‟s 
aspirations to transform Rwanda into a middle income country by the year 2020, combining 
high growth levels with „pro-poor‟ policies as set out in its influential Vision 2020 document 
(GoR, 2000: 4) resonate strongly with this feature.  In practice, the focus has been more on 
growth than redistribution (Ansoms, 2008; Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012) although, through 
its decentralisation programme, service provision and agricultural reform have become policy 
priorities in recent years.   
 
The second feature, focusing on state-society relations, is that the state is not overly-
influenced by particular social groups (captured) but remains connected enough to society 
and enjoys sufficient legitimacy to be able to ensure growth and distribution – what Peter 
Evans (1995) has termed „embedded autonomy‟.   The degree to which this is a feature of the 
Rwandan state at national level remains highly contested.  On the one hand, Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi (2012), following their study of the central role played by the ruling party in 
the development of the private sector, argue that the party‟s investment of dividends from its 
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private holding companies back into the economy represents a shift from the neo-patrimonial 
tendencies of other African regimes towards a more developmental model.  The centralised 
rent-management among a narrow group of Kigali based elites is identified by these authors 
as the key feature of the country‟s developmental success.   On the other hand, this analysis is 
vigorously contested by Nilgün Gökgür who presents evidence to contrarily argue that the 
close relations between the ruling party and its private companies amounts to state capture, 
with state companies turning into extractive institutions which are draining the scarce 
resources of both the state and donors and impeding the development of a more diverse 
private sector (Gökgür, 2012).    
 
A related dimension, and one especially pertinent to this study, is whether high levels of 
authoritarianism are compatible with developmentalism and whether democratic and 
developmental imperatives should (or even can) go hand in hand.  This goes to the heart of 
the „good enough governance‟ debate which advocates some trade-off in democratic 
imperatives against developmental outcomes.  Writing from this perspective, Booth (2011) 
argues that elite level action is what matters and that efforts at broad-based citizen 
participation yield poor results.  “Citizen pressure is at best a weak factor and at worst a 
distraction from dealing with the main drivers of bad governance” (Booth, 2011: 2).  Thus, 
for Booth (2011: 3-4) “sufficiently inclusive coalitions of support” are enough and “the idea 
of „democratic ownership‟…[represents] a step backwards” or a “naïve liberalism” (Booth 
and Golooba-Mutebi, 2014).  A contrary view is provided by Evans (2008) who, looking at 
the requirements of future developmental states, highlights the necessity for broader, more 
complex and more democratic forms of social embeddedness.  According to Evans,  the 21
st
 
century developmental state is one which departs from the narrowly embedded East Asian 
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model and derives its policies “from democratically organised public deliberation” (Evans, 
2010: 43, cited in Routley, 2014: 166).  Interestingly, this view echoes contributions from 
recent peacebuilding literature which highlight the importance of local ownership and 
participation as a key factor in building state legitimacy and support (Bedal, 2009; Menocal, 
2011).   Thus, while the „good enough governance‟ argument highlighting the dangers in 
promoting liberal-democratic norms and institutions regardless of context injects some much 
needed realism into debates about contemporary African states and governance, it  perhaps 
fails to appreciate the underlying premise of Evans‟ future developmental state – that states 
(particularly resource-poor states) depend on active citizen support and participation in the 
developmental project.  The key question therefore becomes whether it is possible for a 
strongly authoritarian or, in Jones et al‟s (2013) terms, „illiberal state‟ to be developmental 
and secure popular legitimacy and support.This is the question examined in this article 
through an examination of local decentralised governance and its political impact.    
 
 
„Participatory‟ planning: Ubudehe and Umuganda 
...citizen participation in decision making is one of [the] key elements of [the] national 
decentralization policy adopted in 2000 and revised in 2013.  By law local 
government authorities are required to conform to participatory process[es] in 
planning and budgeting as well as other processes in their area of jurisdiction... Most 
importantly, citizens participate in planning process[es] directly at the village and 
cell levels.      
MINALOC (2013: x) 
Although the focus of limited academic attention
v, Rwanda‟s ambitious decentralisation 
programme is regarded as one of the country‟s significant successes, both among donors in 
Kigali and within the region more broadly.  Interviewees routinely praised it for its 
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administrative efficiency, its target-driven focus, and for its ability to engage communities 
through innovative participatory planning mechanisms.  These mechanisms are examined 
below.   
 
Ubudehe 
Ubudehe, described by the Ministry of Local Government as “the traditional Rwandan 
practice and cultural value of working together to solve problems” (MINALOC, n.d.: 1), was 
developed in the early 2000s as a local planning mechanism.  Involving a four step process 
(household classification (assigning households to wealth/poverty-based ubudehe categories); 
local resource mapping; problem prioritisation; and action planning (MINALOC, n.d)), the 
process has been hailed as genuinely participative and democratic.  In 2008, the Rwandan 
government was awarded a UN Public Service award for ubudehe and Shah (2013: 53), 
following ethnographic research on the process in the late 2000s, argues that it “...has 
contributed to democratization in Rwanda through the introduction of elements of village 
level participatory democracy and through a less tangible impact on a broader shift from an 
„obedience culture‟ to a „citizenship culture‟ in the country.”.  
 
Today however, little remains of the original process.  Resource maps, once available for 
consultation in the offices of local authorities, are now archived in Kigali and deliberations 
on problem prioritisation and resolution are, for all interviewed for this research, a dim and 
distant memory.  Ubudehe now encompasses the first step only – household categorisation 
(on a 1-7 scale where 1 is the poorest and 7 the most affluent).  While communities remain 
involved in this annual exercise, final decisions on categories now rest with local authorities.  
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Moreover, following the elaboration of a national database of statistics from ubudehe data in 
December 2010, the government is now linking welfare payments and tax obligations to 
ubudehe categories.  Category 1 and 2 households receive some welfare payments through a 
donor funded scheme called VUP
vi
 and their mandatory public health insurance payments are 
waived.   Category 3 households receive no welfare assistance and must pay an annual health 
insurance premium of RwFr 3,000 per household member, with this rising to RwFr 7,000 for 
Category 4 households. 
 
The consequences of this technocratisation of ubudehe are two-fold.  First, with resource 
availability now the guiding factor in household categorisation, interviewees‟ discussions of 
changes in their household categorisations reveals a consequent „upgrading‟ of households to 
Category 3 where they both lose their VUP assistance and become liable for state taxes.  
While the most common category among the 99 interviewees (42 per cent) was Category 2 
last year, this year has seen a significant increase (up to 64 per cent) of households in 
Category 3.  Overall, 31 per cent of interviewees‟ households have been moved up a category 
while just 2 per cent have been moved down one.  Second, there is evidence of unease and 
dissatisfaction with these new classifications.  Overall, 49 per cent of interviewees expressed 
dissatisfaction with their classification.  Very often, this view was provided unsolicited with a 
typical response to an introductory question regarding ubudehe being “I am in Category 3, I 
should be in Category 2”.  Comparing across research sites, a correlation is apparent between 
levels of satisfaction and lower level categorisations.  For example in Site A, where 70 per 
cent of interviewees are in Categories 1 or 2, 80 per cent were happy with their 
categorisation.  Contrarily, in Site E, where 73 per cent of interviewees are in Category 3, 82 
per cent of interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with their categorisation.  While, given the 
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small sample size, these figures in no way reflect overall ubudehe categorisations in the sites 
sampled nor indeed nationally, the findings do suggest a growing dissatisfaction with the 
state‟s increasing financial demands.  As to ubudehe‟s demise, local officials and quite a 
number of civil society representatives argue that its spirit continues in the dialogue, 




Umuganda refers to the tradition, prevalent in the Great Lakes region since the colonial era, 
of obligatory communal labour on public projects.  In Rwanda, umuganda labour works take 
place on the last Saturday morning of every month.  Following the physical work, a meeting 
is held where, in theory, the communal work carried out that day is evaluated and plans for 
further works are discussed and agreed, together with community issues and plans more 
broadly.  The issues raised at these meetings, officials stress, feed upward to cell, sector, and 
district plans with, every five years, a formal upward-planning process taking place for the 
development of the District Development Plan (DDP).   
 
Clearly, for meaningful community participation to take place within any policy or planning 
sphere, there needs to be a well worked out system of ranking of preferences which is open, 
transparent, and follows a set of clearly defined criteria.  Yet none of the local officials 
interviewed were able to outline any prioritisation process used.  At more local levels, 
authorities suggested that issues raised in meetings in different cells and villages are the 
same. “The priorities are similar. They are almost the same with all the cells so it is not like a 
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big problem how to prioritise. All the cells seem to be on the same level.” (Sector Executive 
Secretary, Site E).  At district level, national (EDPRS) and international (MDG) frameworks 
were cited as important yet the link to local priorities remained unclear.  Indeed, a 
representative from one of the donor agencies supporting decentralisation claims that the 
current 5-yearly district planning process, tellingly coordinated this time round by the 
Ministry of Finance rather than the Ministry of Local Government as is the norm, was 
conducted in considerable haste and constituted merely a desk-based exercise with no field 
visits or use of local plans of any sort.  
 
Although the link between umuganda discussions and the planning process appears weak or 
non-existent therefore, discussions do indeed take place following the completion of 
communal labour.  The form of communication acts (instructing, questioning, proposing, 
advocating, criticising etc.) and the discourses employed reveal much about local political 
relations.  A structured observation of a monthly umuganda session in Kigali on February 
23
rd
, 2013 confirmed interviewees‟ assertions that the main purpose of umuganda meetings is 
to instruct residents on the latest reform plans and their roles within these.  The Kigali 
meeting took place outside the local government authority‟s office following several hours of 
communal work clearing ditches.  Seven local officials and approximately 300 community 
members attended.  Over the 50 minutes of the meeting, officials spoke for 40.  Their 
contributions centred on two issues – the announcement of new taxes (for refuse and school 
maintenance) and fines (for failing to attend or bring a hoe to monthly umuganda sessions).  
The meeting included interventions from 12 community members (10 men, 2 women), with 6 
of these insisting on the right to speak as the chair tried to bring proceedings to a close.  Nine 
of these community interventions were queries relating to the new taxes, two related to a 
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local theft and the final one was a proposal (rejected as it is not in the DDP) to use next 
month‟s umuganda work to repair the local bridge.  Overall, the substance, tenor and tone of 
local authority contributions stifled rather than facilitated debate and revealed paternalistic 
attitudes and disciplinary intent as officials repeatedly stressed the benefits of government 
reforms and the responsibility of all to contribute, rebuking those who questioned the 
announcements.  There was, however, a lack of clarity on the precise costs of the new taxes 
and clearly, on a case by case basis, room for manoeuvre.  For example, the education tax 
was initially announced as being a monthly tax of RwFr 5,000 per household.  In response to 
a number of queries for more clarity (given, as participants noted, that a once-off „education 
tax‟ had been paid three months previously), it was then announced that it was to be a RwFr 
3,000 annual payment.  The amount appeared therefore, somewhat arbitrary.  Moreover, 
officials then added that anyone experiencing difficulties paying this should “go negotiate 
with” their local authority leader.  While this perhaps suggests some flexibility in local 
taxation rates, it also highlights a potential for abuse and clientelism.  In response to these 
announcements, the substance and tenor of individual community contributions demonstrated 
considerable resistance to the escalating costs of these reforms.  More broadly among those 
present, while announcements of new taxes invoked murmurs of dissent and disquiet, 
individual participants‟ queries in this regard were met with applause and good natured 
laughter.  A telling moment came when the chair reprimanded attendees for only applauding 
individuals‟ queries regarding the announced taxes, but not the officials‟ responses.  His 
request for applause for local officials was met with a stony silence.   
 
These patterns are replicated in accounts of umuganda provided by individual interviewees 
although a somewhat high number of interviewees claim to have spoken.  Overall, 65 per 
Page | 13  
 
cent of all male interviewees and just under 50 per cent of all females claim to have spoken at 
an umuganda meeting.  They classify their interventions as being either complaints and/or 
questions regarding certain activities, projects or taxes announced by local leaders.  In 
general, villagers characterise umuganda meetings as being the forum where local leaders 
communicate to them the latest government programmes and their role within these.   
 
The scale and depth of the disciplined inclusion of communities into these programmes is 
demonstrated  by local officials‟ frustration with what they term the “mindset” or “mentality” 
of the population who remain resistant to government programmes.  As the following 
excerpts reveal, the aim is to inculcate new behavioural attributes through both instruction 
and direction as well as on-going scrutiny and surveillance to ensure imposed activities are 
carried out.   
 
When we are in development we need to change the peoples‟ mentalities... there is a 
population who thinks that everything should be carried out by the state.  But they 
also have an important role which they have started to realise, which they did not 
know before.  And so the process is to change their mentality to understand that they 
also can work, that they can also participate - there is a challenge within it of 
sensitisation. 
       (District Vice-Mayor, Site D) 
 
  
The first job we have is to change the comportment and the mentality of the 
population. To do this is a process.  
Question: How do you change this mentality?   
We do lots of meetings with the population.  Through these meetings we tell the 
population what [how] we wish things to be.  We also do home visits to verify that 
what we have said is being put into practice.  We follow what the population does. 




To deal with the population is not an easy thing.  It is obvious that there might be 
some challenges. There are some that have this mindset that is not easy to change.  
Question: What is the mindset that is not easy to change?   
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People who are too old, an old man, or those who have never been to school. They 
are the ones that we have to keep telling them to make so much effort to make change.  
We are in a country that is in a hurry.  So there is an urgency in implementing 
government programmes and it can take an old man more time to understand and get 
the point. 
     (Cell Executive Secretary, Site C – my emphasis) 
 
Overall, although clearly a distance from the broad, open dialogue which some interviewees 
in Kigali assert takes place, findings relating to umuganda do demonstrate that a space exists 
for residents to voice their views.  Perhaps more importantly, they appear keen to exercise 
this voice – most particularly in relation to dissent and concern on the growing personal costs 
of ongoing reforms.  There is little evidence to suggest however, that these concerns are 
being heard and acted upon in broad policy terms - although, as noted above, individual 
representation to local officials to plead individual cases appears possible.  Further evidence 
is provided in the next section to demonstrate this. .   
 
Community and local official priorities compared 
A simple comparison of community and local officials‟ priorities wherein both parties (in 
interview) were asked to rank, in order of priority, the most important, pressing issues in their 
areas, reveals clear differences between both groups.  For community members, the top three 
issues (in order of priority - domestic conflict and violence; food security and land access; 
and access to health services (denied for those who fail to pay their annual health premium)) 
reflect the multidimensionality of poverty and its effects on psychological as well as physical 
wellbeing.  For local officials, the top three issues (expansion and development of the 
government‟s „land consolidation‟ programme (wherein individuals are instructed to pool 
their land to intensively cultivate specific crops as instructed by local agricultural extension 
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agents); collection of annual health insurance premiums from all households; and the 
development of local savings and credit cooperatives) display an adherence to the national 
government‟s priorities (see GoR, 2013).  Indeed, local officials note that a failure to meet 80 
per cent of their targets (which, drawing from national priorities, include these three issues) 
means they lose their jobs, so clearly the pressures are immense.   These differences between 
officials‟ and communities‟ priorities underscore the poor responsiveness and lack of 
effectiveness of the government‟s reforms in meeting local needs.  Yet, as we have seen, 
communities are being forced to share the costs of these reforms.  The extent of this cost-
sharing and its consequences are explored in the following section. 
 
Revenue redistribution or revenue generation: Who pays? 
While the percentage of devolved resources to districts is reported to have increased to 
approximately 33 per cent of the national budget in recent years (MINALOC, 2013: 19), 
district budgets remain complex and opaque and figures for actual (as opposed to budgeted) 
expenditures are not, unlike in other countries, publicly available.  Interviews with district 
budget officers and other officials revealed considerable confusion regarding both the 
provenance (direct ministerial transfers vs. block grants. vs. earmarked donor funds – these 
are all included together in budgets) and the destination (district, sector or cell – this 
information is not available) of devolved funds.  A clear sectoral breakdown of expenditure 
(salaries, administration costs, education spending etc.) is also unavailable.  In this context, it 
remains unclear how much national revenue is redistributed for local development.  What is 
clear however is that households and communities contribute a substantial amount, both in 
the form of umuganda voluntary labour and in financial contributions.  While umuganda 
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works officially take place just once a month, in rural areas they are far more frequent.  In the 
sites visited for this research, umuganda works were being organised 2-3 times a week.  
Many of these involved construction projects – schools, credit and savings facilitiesvii and 
offices for cell leaders
viii
 were among the most common activities.  Community participation 
in this context equals free labour for externally imposed programmes and projects and, as a 
sector leader explains below, it is the community and not the state who pays.   
The participation of the population, that is when you can use them well. For [the] 
construction of the bridge [in the sector centre] for example... For example, the credit 
and saving building was built by the population. There were no funds from the 
government or from any organisations. We just needed to mobilise the population and 
it was built. 
       (Sector Executive Secretary, Site A) 
As well as contributing labour, households are also required to financially contribute to a 
range of projects and programmes including local building projects, local services and the 
public health insurance scheme – the mutuelle.  These payments prove extremely difficult for 
families and households which are already struggling to meet their daily requirements and 
are, as we have seen, a source of growing resentment and frustration.  There are a number of 
reasons for this growing unease. 
 
First, for many households it simply proves too difficult to manage to pay these obligatory 
contributions.  One of the payments consistently highlighted – partly because of cost and 
partly because of worries over not being able to access health care – is the annual health 
insurance premium.  As we have seen, with an increasing number of households being re-
categorised upward in the ubudehe scheme, the burden of payment for this scheme has 
shifted significantly away from the state and towards households.  While some interviewees 
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related stories of coercion by local leaders in efforts to bring in these payments in previous 
years (forcing households to sell livestock for example), a „softer‟ form of coercion involving 
loans appears to be the current strategy.  Two interviewees explain how they have managed. 
We have made associations [groupings of a number of households] and borrowed 
money from the bank to pay our mutuelle [health insurance].  All of us here have done 
this. 
       (Interviewee, male, Site A) 
For the health insurance it is mandatory.  You must pay this. Last year they brought 
us books from the bank.  The cell leader brought these.  So whenever you get [FrRw] 
500 you take this to the village chief.  He takes the money and he signs that he has 
deposited this. So by the time of buying a new health insurance, they saw how much 
we had deposited.  If we had not deposited enough, they [cell authorities] would lend 
us the money.  So now some of us are paying back for this. 
       (Interviewee, female, Site B)  
For particularly vulnerable households (ubudehe categories 1 and 2), there are reports of VUP 
welfare payments being used to pay taxes as they are introduced - thus re-absorbing scarce 
redistributed resources back to the centre.  A representative from one of the international 
agencies supporting one of the social welfare programmes outlines the problem. 
I want to talk about the extent to which households have free choice in how they use 
those [welfare] resources in the current context. For example in our programme, 
when it was in full pelt, if you talked to people about what they spend their money on, 
a lot of it was spent on iron sheeting for their roofs [an obligatory purchase last year 
when thatch roofs were outlawed]. This is a very delicate area and it‟s a very tricky 
one but I think there is something there about the extent to which households have full 
control of the choices they make and about the resources they receive when local 
space is so controlled by the sector administration in terms of how a household 
behaves and the contributions they have to make. 
      (Representative of international agency, Kigali) 
 
Second, there is considerable lack of clarity around local budgets.  In contrast to decentralised 
arrangements in neighbouring Burundi and the DRC, in Rwanda there is no legal provision 
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for making the district budget public.  Moreover, while district meetings themselves are 
technically public (Article 36, GoR, 2006), public notice of these meetings is never provided 
and the public never attends.  None of the 99 villagers interviewed for this research was 
aware of when district meetings are scheduled and none had ever attended such a meeting.  
Consequently, community members are not familiar with even the broad contours of local 
budgets, including sectoral allocations.  
 
Third, it remains unclear to citizens how much of the collected taxes are actually used as they 
should be.  Moreover, taxes can be negotiated on a one-to-one basis with local authorities.  
As one interviewee notes: 
You have to pay for the community policing. Do a simple calculation. You pay 1000 
per month. And this is an area of 800 households so it is already 800,000. And 
imagine, the guy earns maximum 15,000 per month. And they have 5 people.  So 
that‟s 75,000.  So what happens with the 725,000 FrRw?  Nobody knows.  And this is 
just one contribution. Then you have to pay here and you have to pay there. And it‟s 
always more and more and more. And you don‟t know what‟s happening with the 
money.  
While President Kagame exercises a strict no tolerance policy for corruption at national level, 
there are broad allegations of small scale corruption or “manipulation” at local levels, in part 
exacerbated by the reliance on voluntary labour from local leaders at the most local levels 
and in part by the clientelist nature of local leadership (interviews Kigali, see also IRDP, 
2011).       
And fourth, as we have seen in the account of the umuganda meeting in Kigali, people 
complain that the number and amount of these contributions are rapidly escalating.  This is 
borne out by the government‟s own plans for local revenue generation.  The revised 
Decentralisation Policy notes the low level of revenue generation at local level and is aiming 
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to increase this significantly.  “It is anticipated that with effective tax administration, within 
the first year of implementing the LG tax law, local government revenues will increase from 
the present RwF 16 billion to as much as RwF 90 billion.” (MINALOC, 2013: 19).  In 
addition, in the wake of aid cuts at the beginning of 2013, the government introduced a new 
tax to fund a new Rwanda Development Fund.  Under this scheme, public servants must pay 
a months‟ salary per annum (or a 12th of their salary).  It has since been expanded for all 
salaried employees including those in poorly remunerated jobs.  While this payment is still 
called „voluntary‟, interviewees note that there is no such thing as a voluntary contribution, 
“It is called voluntary but it is not.  Even X, he was told that he had to contribute and that he 
didn‟t have a choice. The umudugudu [village] chief came around with a list and said „this is 
what your neighbour paid‟. And he just had to do it. If you don‟t sign and pay, then you are 
in trouble.” 
 
Taken together, the findings indicate that while space is provided for local communities to 
voice their views, opinions and concerns, little attention is paid to these as local government 
officials, tied to centrally driven targets and programmes, continue their disciplining and soft 
coercion of local communities.  With the costs of centrally driven reforms shifting to 
communities, the pressures on and disquiet among these communities are growing.  
Moreover, while some reforms certainly do address some community needs – for example 
agricultural production – there is a clear mismatch between the majority of priorities of local 
authorities and those of communities.  As popular disquiet and unease with this situation 
grow,  they raise questions in relation to the longterm impact of local reform politics on 
government legitimacy.  These questions are pertinent to both the „good enough governance‟ 
agenda and to the nature and dynamics of evolving developmental states.   
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Conclusion:  When is “Good enough governance” good enough ? 
Reflecting on international donors‟ acceptance if not tacit approval of the strongly 
authoritarian nature of the Kigali regime, a number of commentators suggest that donors are 
more concerned with developmental outcomes and meeting the MDGs than with governance 
per se in the country (Beswick, 2010; Hayman, 2011; Zorbas, 2011).  This is corroborated in 
interviews with donors conducted for this research where, although some concerns were 
expressed in relation to authoritarian governance practices at national level, it was broadly 
assumed that far more freedom and tolerance is allowed at local levels.  It would appear that 
the international community in Kigali is implicitly, if not explicitly, influenced by the „good 
enough governance‟ agenda.  A problem here however is that it remains unclear what „good 
enough governance‟ really means.  Does it mean, as suggested by Booth and colleagues, 
ignoring local political dynamics and relations altogether?  Or is there some middle ground in 
terms of prioritisation of focus and resources that should be considered?  If the former, while, 
as noted above, sympathetic to the argument that promoting liberal-democratic norms and 
institutions regardless of context is unhelpful and ineffective, the findings from this research 
resonate with the lessons of history in highlighting the dangers of a national elite focus alone 
which ignores the evolving dynamics of local state-societal relations.   
 
Specifically, this research has demonstrated that the increasing centralisation of deliberation 
and decision-making on local development priorities coupled with the growing pressures and 
demands on local communities to invest – physically and financially – in their own 
development as dictated by the ruling regime‟s fast-track developmental programme is 
leading to growing levels of popular disquiet and dissent.  This necessarily raise questions 
Page | 21  
 
regarding the level of embeddedness and legitimacy of the regime and therefore the 
sustainability of its development project,  To return to the questions posed at the outset, the 
findings suggest that an authoritarian or „illiberal‟ state can indeed be developmental, but that 
this comes at not inconsiderable cost to both its citizens and its own legitimacy.  Rwanda‟s 
neo-developmentalist experiment is certainly ambitious.  However, when considered in the 
broader context of the careful management and negation of historic and ongoing ethnic and 
centre-periphery animosities within Rwanda, it remains to be seen whether the country‟s 
governance culture will prove „good enough‟ for its nine million citizens who are, in more 
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i
 It should be noted that a discrepancy exists between the government‟s figures and those of the UNDP.  While 
the government reports a Gini coefficient of 0.49, the most recent UNDP report cites a Gini coefficient of 0.53, 
ranking Rwanda as the fifth most unequal economy on the African continent (UNDP, 2013: 154).. 
ii
 Rwanda‟s decentralisation programme is much admired in the region.  Donors supporting decentralisation in 
both neighbouring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have organised study trips with political 
leaders and officials to Rwanda and regard it as a model to emulate (interviews Bujumbura, August-September, 
2011 and Kinshasa, February-March, 2013). 
iii
 Although the National Institute for Statistical Research (NISR) claims that visas are only required for large-
scale quantitative survey research, a visa was deemed necessary for this research.  Although initially blocked on 
the grounds that “As similar research have [sic] been undertaken this could lead to some contradiction of [sic] 
with the existing findings” (email correspondence, NISR, November 20th, 2012), the necessary visa was finally 
sanctioned the day after DfID suspended its aid due to allegations of ongoing Rwandan interference in Eastern 
Congo.   
iv
 It should be noted that this is not the first time this concept has been applied to African states.  The early years 
of independence were characterised by state-led developmentalism but a combination of internal (mainly 
predatory neopatrimonialism) and external (falling commodity prices, global recession and the debt crisis) 
factors resulted in economic and political crisis by the 1980s.  
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v
 Notable exceptions include Van Tilburg who remains cautiously optimistic that “...the process of 
decentralisation and the accompanying attempts towards good governance have contributed towards a more 
legitimate political order” (2008: 228), and Ingelaere  who, focusing on the first local elections (in 2006), 
argues that, by displacing locally elected representatives with centrally appointed authorities, “ ... under the 
guise of „decentralisation‟, the RPF has actually expanded the central state‟s political reach down to the local 
level.  (2011: 68). 
vi
 The VUP programme targets low income households and provides cash transfers (direct and in return for 
work) and micro-credit facilities. 
vii
 Part of the government‟s current programme (and local imihigos) is the promotion of savings and loans 
among citizens.  Facilities for this – SACCOs – are currently under construction or completion in sectors 
throughout the country.   
viii
 Offices for cell leaders were under construction in all sites visited.  These are also in current imihigos. 
